The decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany that the German voting system used for elections to the Bundestag (Germany’s parliament) is unconstitutional has prompted several proposals for a new voting system. This article provides a game theoretical understanding of the current system and shows that it is not strategy proof. Further, the current electoral system and two proposed electoral systems are tested for desirable properties and the differences between them will be analysed. For this purpose a statistical analysis of historical data is conducted. In adition, the way that votes translate into political power as captured by power indices will be used to look at the political influence of individual parties. It will be concluded that both proposals do better with regard to the occurrence of the redistribution paradox and strategy proofness.
|Titel:||Power in German Politics: An Analysis of the German Electoral System / Josef Schmalfuss|
|Hochschulschrift:||University of Cambridge, Bachelorarbeit, 2010|